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Abstract 
According to the resource curse hypothesis, natural resource abundance can lead to lower 
growth. The literature has mainly focused on economic explanations, but some scholars have 
suggested that the curse can be turned into a blessing with good institutions. It has been 
argued that Quality of Government (QoG) and constraints on executives are important 
conditions for economic growth but these aspects have not been studied in depth in the 
resource curse literature. This thesis therefore examines whether theories regarding QoG, 
constraints on executive and the resource curse are supported in an empirical regression 
analysis of more than 40 countries over 16 years. The thesis also presents an extensive 
literature review on the explanations of the curse. The main result from this thesis is that the 
curse is only evident in countries with low QoG. Countries with high QoG avoid the curse and 
benefits from their natural resources. The evidence for a curse is not as strong as some 
scholars argue. The political-institutional variables upraised here need to be explored by 
further research in order to test whether stronger effect on the resource curse exists.  
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1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the effect of natural resources on growth and deals with a classical 
account in the literature exemplified as the resource curse hypothesis (Sachs & Warner 1995). 
“We are fortunate to not have oil or diamonds” said Lenoardo Simao (the former minister of 
foreign affairs in Mozambique), which illustrates issues related to natural resources (Boshini 
et al 2007:613). The idea is that the economy of natural resource abundant countries tend to 
grow economically slower than countries with less abundance, and this has been highlighted 
by researchers during the past decades. The phenomenon has been labeled the “Resource 
Curse” and the countries of Algeria, Congo, Nigeria, Mexico, and Sierra Leone are good 
examples of the resource curse as the countries’ growth have been poor despite richness in 
natural resources (Torvik 2009:46). Japan, Korea and Singapore, on the other hand, provide 
examples of countries with substantially lower amount of natural resources demonstrating a 
strong economic growth during recent decades. Natural resource rich countries such as 
Botswana, Norway, Canada, and Malaysia demonstrate that it is possible to avoid the resource 
curse, perhaps with the right tools of management.  
 
The modern research on the resource curse can be said to have started in 1995 with the 
classical work of Sachs and Warner (1995a). The authors find a negative correlation between 
resource abundance and economic growth, suggesting that natural resource rich countries 
perform worse than natural resource poor countries (Sachs & Warner 1995a). It is however 
surprising that recent studies have used the same data from Sachs and Warner who analyze 
the years 1970-1990, when more recent data is available. The literature about the resource 
curse would furthermore benefit from an expansion of Sachs and Warner’s model where 
alternative explanations and interaction effects are taken account for. The causal mechanisms 
that drive the alleged resource should also be theorized in more detail, in order to achieve a 
more complex understanding of why many resource rich countries fail to produce high rates 
of economic growth.  
 
Quality of government (QoG) is one of the alternative explanations of the resource curse 
which should be both explained and tested in further depth. QoG is a concept that deals with 
the reliability, impartiality and the level of corruption of governmental institutions. Research 
on the subject has suggested that increasing level of QoG causes economic growth to 
accelerate (Rothstein & Teorell 2008). QoG also distinguishes impartiality as a morale 
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principle (Ibid), which is relevant due to cases of suspicious extraction from natural resources 
for personal benefits. QoG could possibly be an essential factor for avoiding the curse.  
This study also examines how constraints on the executive affect growth in resource rich 
countries. This thesis is to my knowledge the first paper that examines interactive effects 
between natural resource abundance and constraints on economic growth.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to provide new insight on the resource curse, and to explore some 
potential limitations in previous research. The present study examines Sachs & Warner’s 
model with more recent data, time series methodology and an extended set of potential 
explanations. Also, the levels of QoG and growth have changed in many countries since 1990 
and the model that Sachs & Warner (1995a) examined for countries in the time period 1970-
1990 does therefore not necessarily predict economic growth as well in the post 1990-era. 
This study consequently contributes to the existing literature about economic growth and the 
resource curse on three points: First, by discussing important theoretical perspectives and 
limitations of previous research; Second, by analyzing an extended, empirical model of 
resource curse dynamics and economic growth; and Third, by interpreting the hypotheses that 
are derived from the theoretical literature in light of the estimated model. The text is 
organized accordingly, with a literature review and theory section which is preceded by a 
discussion of methods and data and at last an analysis section and a conclusion.  
 
This analysis finds that the resource curse only is evident when it is conditioned by QoG. 
Resource abundant countries with low QoG are trapped in the curse while resource abundant 
countries with high QoG tend to acquire higher growth. The “curse effect” is otherwise not 
apparent. The effect does not hold with control variables and needs to be further tested. The 
effect of executive constraints was not statistically proven while the interaction for political 
system indicates that resource abundant parliamentarian countries experience higher growth 
than presidential countries with similar natural resource exports. The QoG interaction 
hypothesis is more supported than the other interactions. I suggest that further research needs 
to address issues of conditional effects (interactions) that have not been adequately dealt with 
in previous literature. 
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2 Theory 
2.1 Literature review  
Three different outcomes of resource abundance on growth have been established in the 
literature: negative, positive or no effect. The scholars who find a negative effect have 
dominated the field and also defined resource abundance as a “curse” (Sachs & Warner 
2001:837).  The findings were highlighted in several articles from the end of the 90s to the 
beginning of 00s (Gylfason 1999, Atkinson & Hamilton 2003). 
The second outcome is a positive effect on growth and there are few articles that show 
evidence of such a relation. What has been highlighted is that different types of resources can 
lead to different results (Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian 2003) and some of the evidence is 
found over different time periods (Ibid, Lederman & Maloney 2003).  
The third outcome in the literature does not find any effect of resource abundance on growth. 
According to these studies, there is not enough evidence for a curse. Studies in this part have 
tended to revolve around previous research (Van Der Ploeg 2011) and underlining the 
limitations of previous studies (Manzano & Rigobon 2008). I will discuss the outcomes more 
in detail below. 
 
The general point of the resource curse is that countries with more natural resources tend to 
perform worse than countries with fewer natural resources. Several studies have illustrated 
this relation (Gelb 1988; Auty 1990; Gylfason 1999 et al). Others have reached similar results 
while using different measurements, some find evidence for a resource curse when addressing 
oil exports as an independent variable (Kaldor et al 2007; Ross 2001; Subramanian et al 2003; 
Smith 2004). Sachs & Warner (1995a) also find a negative effect of natural resource 
abundance when examining the effects of oil and minerals. They find the curse in 97 
developing countries from the years 1970-1990 and argue that resource abundant economies 
reach slower growth (Sachs & Warner 1995a).  
 
Previous research has also examined exceptions with resource abundant countries that 
experience a positive effect on growth, which constitute concerns to the resource curse 
argument. Botswana is a diamond rich country that has shown a remarkable growth in recent 
decades and has therefore been studied in depth. Why has Botswana succeeded? Some 
attempts to explain the success of Botswana have been put on the consequence of accountable 
officials, good governance throughout the regions, and an overall strong state capacity 
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(Astushi 2007:668). Others note that strong institutions were established before the resources 
were discovered (Eigan 2005:2). At the same time, an economic policy was well implemented 
to avoid external debt, which has been a concern for other resource abundant countries (Ibid). 
The combination of good governance and accountable officials points to a less problematic 
acquirement of natural resources. The government owns much of the shares in mining firms 
and also asserts control over the mining sector (Astushi 2007:676). Botswana has more 
successfully monitored and managed their resource sector than numerous other countries that 
are considered to be trapped in the curse. In these countries, the government might be in 
control of the natural resources, but it is often the lack of accountability and weak institutions 
that lead to adverse development (Amundsen 2014:176).  
Alexeev & Conrad (2009) controlled for several variables – particularly dummies for East 
Asia and Latin America – and found that oil and mineral wealth had a positive effect on 
income per capita (Alexeev & Conrad 2009). Lederman & Maloney (2003) also find a 
positive correlation (Behbudi et al 2010:85). 
 
Several quantitative studies do not find any particular evidence for a curse (Maloney 2002; 
Davis 1995; Herb 2005; Delacroix 1977). Some argue that both cases exist and that it is up to 
each country to turn a possible curse into a blessing (Van Der Ploeg 2011). Manzano and 
Rigobon (2008) find methodological issues with previous research and argue for a limited 
effect of resource abundance (Manzano & Rigobon 2008). Lederman & Maloney (2008) go 
further and argue that there is evidence of a negative correlation but that the description of a 
curse is problematic, and claim that interaction terms could lead to a better understanding of 
the relation (Lederman & Maloney 2008:52).  
 
Empirical studies have found evidence for a negative, positive and no effect on growth. The 
findings in the literature would suggest more evidence for a curse. The major contributions 
come from Sachs and Warner (1995a). Sachs and Warner’s model (1995a) measures several 
geographical, economic and political variables, but lacks some important explanations. 
Institutional indicators should be more emphasized which I have aimed to do in this thesis. 
There are also some methodological concerns. Sachs and Warner (1995a) use a cross 
sectional method, not time series, and this might imply that Sachs and Warner (1995a) might 
have overlooked time series variation. The scholars focus on 1970-1990 while this thesis puts 
focus on the years from 1980 to 2010. Even though it is interesting to look upon more years, it 
is unlikely that this will prompt new discoveries. With that said, some scholars address 
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criticisms about the years that Sachs and Warner examined as the 19070’s debt crises resulted 
in a debt overhang in countries with much resources (Manzano & Rigobon 2001:22) The 
explanations of why natural resource lead to lower growth is often overlooked in this part. I 
therefore intend to correct these limitations and examine the hypotheses with a more 
appropriate methodological approach. 
2.1.2 Economic explanations 
Economic explanations have dominated the field of the resource curse and several important 
contributions have been put forward. This is not surprising as a large part of the research on 
this topic is also dominated by economists. The most notable discussion in the literature 
revolves around the Dutch disease. The Dutch disease argument was used to describe the 
1960s when the Netherlands found natural gas in the North Sea. The gained wealth resulted in 
an appreciation of the currency, which made other Dutch exports less competitive. The 
government in the Netherlands had already used parts of the windfall from the gas revenues to 
establish a generous welfare system.
1
 The country’s income however dropped dramatically 
and ultimately resulted in an economic stagnation (Ibid). 
 
The Dutch disease identifies the difficulty with high concentration in exports, and refers to 
some problematic side effects of a boom in natural resources. The problem arises when the 
boom causes an increase in spending, an appreciation in the currency, an increase in non-
traded goods and a current account deficit (Frankel 2010:19).  The Dutch disease model 
assumes that an economy has three sectors: a tradable natural resource sector, a tradable non-
resource manufacturing sector and a non-traded sector (Sachs & Warner 1995a:6). The 
demand for non-tradable goods is greater if natural resource revenues increase and non-
tradable goods are goods that usually are not traded (for example construction, 
communication, electricity). The disease evolves because most focus is put on the resource 
tradable sector, which leaves the manufacturing sector to shrink as it becomes less 
competitive to the appreciation of the currency (Ibid). 
 
The consequences of the disease are determined by two types of effects: The spending effect 
and the resource movement effect (Fardmanesh 1991:711). The spending effect involves the 
process of exchange rates and if the exchange rate is fixed, the exchange of the foreign 
                                                             
1 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/dutch.htm 
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currency into the local currency increases the country’s money supply, and domestic pressure 
would boost the domestic prices. This leads to a more expensive domestic market and makes 
a country’s products less competitive.2 If the exchange rate is flexible, the additional supply 
of foreign currency drives up the value of the domestic currency and causes the traditional 
manufacturing sector to shrink.  
The resource movement effect happens when capital and labor shifts to the production of 
domestic goods which are not internationally traded, this is a reaction to the domestic demand 
and a consequence of the resource boom (Fardmanesh 1991:712, img.org). The boom will 
lead to an appreciation of the currency and a less competitive manufacturing sector. The 
manufacturing sector shrinks because of the boom. Exports in a country are therefore more 
expensive after the boom than before which ultimately could lead to lower growth.  
 
Fardmanesh (1991) finds evidence supporting the Dutch disease hypotheses. He claims that 
Ecuador, Indonesia and Nigeria were affected by their oil boom as they reduced the 
agricultural sector due to the increase of their oil revenues (Fardmanesh 1991:714).   
Other scholars such as Van Wijnbergen (1984) Krugman (1987) Gylfason (1997) have all 
stressed several models which imply a decline in productivity (Torvik 2001:286). Sachs & 
Warner (1995a) use growth effects to model for the Dutch disease and find evidence for the 
theory, as tradable manufacturing versus natural resource sector matters for endogenous 
growth (Sachs & Warner 1995a:22).  
 
Another explanation revolves around rent seeking, rent describes income that is above 
normal, which means income that is higher than what a company or individual would have 
accepted normally (Khan 2000:3). Rent centers on individual activities while rent seeking 
refers to collective activities. Rent seeking is the attempt to an actor or a group to gain 
unrightfully access to a country’s share of existing wealth without creating new wealth, 
through dubious actions. If the productivity increases, each group in a given society aims to 
receive a greater share of production by demanding more transfers (Torvik 2001:456). They 
seek to create, maintain or change the rights and institutions on which rents are based on 
(Khan 2000:4, Tollison 1988). The presence of rents gives incentives for groups to discover 
more beneficial ways of their resources. It occurs when people seek rents to reach benefits 
through the political arena, subsidies, tariffs or regulations that hinder competitors are 
                                                             
2
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/dutch.htm 
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examples of ways rent seeking can be attained. When it comes to natural resource rents, the 
issue of scarceness derives (Khan 2000:33). For example, if a country is highly abundant in 
diamonds, rents would create competition for the diamonds which require more diamonds, 
and more time invested in mining firms. It is therefore fundamental that the cost of attaining 
diamonds is equal to the benefits of having them. The problem with rent seeking arises when 
the costs are higher than the benefits. One way in how this has been observed is through time 
consuming rent seeking which crowds out time and investment in other fields, fields that 
could generate more growth in the long term, such as education (Wadho 2014:149).   
 
Lane and Tornell (1995) argue that resource rich countries tend to provide extreme rent 
seeking as national politics is oriented to grabbing the rents earned by the natural resource 
endowments (Sachs & Warner 1995a:4). There are several studies that find rent seeking 
behavior within natural resource rich countries (Gelb 1988). This has also been found when 
looking at the case of Zambia: Zambian management of mineral dependence triggered a 
decline in growth due to rent seeking behavior (Auty 1991:183). The Zambian government 
approached rent seeking from urban groups as post independent policies aimed to organize 
rents from copper. The copper rents were managed through mines and factories and led way 
to an urbanization of the population in the 1970s, much higher than most other African 
countries (Auty 1991:174). Some scholars argue that natural resources lead to rent seeking 
(Auty 2001; 2004; Ross 2001). Rents can increase the rebels’ desire to capture the state, even 
though the capability of the rebels to capture the state might be low (Ross 2004:344). Ross 
(2004) argues that resource rich governments often have tools to suppress rebellions as 
resource abundance leads to an increase of governmental expenses on military (Ross 
2004:344). Auty (2001a) argues that rents prompt a certain type of political state. He claims 
that resource abundant countries tend to be “factional oligarchy” or “predatory states” that 
look after exclusive interests in the expense of a sound economic policy and social welfare 
(Auty 2001a:844) Another approach looked upon ethnicity and found that natural resources 
lead to rent seeking, poor institutions and low growth in fractionalized societies, but to little 
rent seeking in homogenous societies (Hodler 2006).  
 
The literature has aimed to explain why resource abundant developing countries struggle 
more. These countries tend to be economically smaller, as well as more likely to specialize in 
the export of basic/primary commodities, such as oil (Frankel 2010:6). Prebisch and Singer 
explore why primary goods might be problematic for developing countries. The idea is that 
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the demand for manufactured goods is greater than for primary products. Because developing 
countries are more likely to specialize in primary goods, they will experience lower growth 
than developed countries which specialize in manufactured goods (Harvey et al 2010:367). 
Specializing in primary exports such as natural resources is challenging for the economy, 
because industrialized countries will benefit more than primary goods economies, due to a 
higher demand for manufactured goods (Frankel 2010:5). The finding holds that north and 
south will grow differently, as south has been more dependent on primary products, while in 
the north there have been producers of manufactured goods (Harvey et al 2010:367).  
Harvey et al. (2010) find some support for the hypothesis (Ibid), while Frankel claimed that 
the effect from the Prebisch & Singer hypothesis was weak (Frankel 2010:34).  
 
Another hypothesis concerns the instability in prices of natural resource products. The 
hypothesis suggests that it is the instability of the natural resource prices that can hurt the 
economy, rather than the trend which is suggested in the Prebisch & Singer hypothesis 
(Blattman et al 2007). It is believed that the prices of natural resources are difficult to predict, 
and therefore constitute a problem if, for example, the prices were to drop. Other studies reach 
a similar conclusion, arguing that the mechanism derives from the interaction between the 
specialization in non-tradables and the financial market imperfections – if the non-tradable 
sector disappears, the economy becomes more volatile (Hausmann & Rigobon 2003).  
 
Some scholars reject the resource curse argument and claim that it is rather a matter of a debt 
overhang than a curse of resources. Manzano & Rigobon (2001) argue that commodity prices 
were high in the 70s and this might have induced resource abundant countries to use them as a 
guarantee. In the 80s, during a decline in commodity prices, resource abundant countries fell 
to a debt crisis, in other words, a debt overhang (Manzano & Rigobon 2001:22). As 
mentioned in this text, much of the literature focuses on the years 1970-1990, initially the 
same period that Sachs and Warner (1995a) examined. 
 
I have in this section discussed important economic explanations that involve some of the 
most apparent arguments for why natural resource abundance can lead to a decline in growth. 
This thesis discusses economic arguments in relation to political-institutional arguments, 
which is rare in the literature. Even though most scholars are testing different factors (e.g. 
Sachs & Warner 1995a:1997), the explanations apart from the economic ones are not always 
studied properly. The economic aspects are nevertheless profoundly emphasized in the 
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literature. The Dutch disease and rent seeking have been the most apparent models at this 
juncture. I believe these models are helpful in partly understanding the resource curse, but 
other aspects are also important, such as political-institutional explanations which seem to 
have a limited discussion in the research presented in this section. Furthermore, I believe that 
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis is of less importance when it comes to understanding the 
resource curse as it attempts to explain it through developing countries. The curse might be 
more evident in developing countries, but it is not exclusively the primary goods sector that is 
causing it. Recent research argue that it is not an issue of developing countries, or an 
abundance in primary products that causes low growth, but rather an issue of the quality of 
institutions (Mehlum et al 2006).  
2.1.3 Political - institutional explanations 
The political and institutional explanations were proposed later than the economic 
explanations, but have recently been emphasized by several scholars. A political-institutional 
label can be put on these explanations as they address institutions, governments, types of 
systems, among other factors, and how these factors affect the economic growth in resource 
abundant countries. These indicators usually appear in a conditional framework, for example 
that natural resources hamper growth only in countries with weak institutions. The overall 
idea is that bad institutions lead to inequality, intermittent dictatorship and a difficulty to 
prevent elites and politicians from taking it all. Good institutions would function coherently 
and impartially to provide services that benefit businesses and entrepreneurs – which provides 
a suitable institutional framework and consequently lead to sustained growth (see Keefer & 
Knack 1995, Hall et al 2010).  It might however be difficult to adapt good institutions 
abruptly. Institutions are said to evolve and emerge as a result of social interactions. 
Sometimes institutions derive from deliberate initiatives, and sometimes they appear to be 
arbitrary (Hersberg 2010:8).  A possible channel in how good or bad institutions have been 
created is suggested by Acemoglu & Robinson (2001). Acemoglu & Robinson’s (2001) “The 
Colonial Origins of Comparative Development” stress that only the colonies where Europeans 
settled were given good institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson 2001:1369). The authors apply 
data on mortality rates of soldiers, bishops and sailors between the 17
th
 and 19
th
 centuries in 
order to test their hypotheses. The mortality rates of the early settlers affected the overall 
settlement, in which early institutions were formed. The institutional conditions were 
accordingly dependent on mortality rates, with lower rates indicating a smoother settlement 
and a more likely initiation of good institutions. The initial institutions continued in a path 
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dependent way, and this led to the standards of current institutions. Acemoglu & Robinson 
argue that the current performance among former colonies can be traced back to the initial 
institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson 2008:1370). They do not address natural resources 
specifically, but design a model to understand why weak institutions are formed. Resources 
might, however, have been a part of the establishment. The authors point to the fact that in 
extreme cases European colonizers initiated extractive states with weak institutional 
framework, to transfer resources back home (Acemoglu & Robinson 2008:1370). It is not 
specified whether these resources were especially crucial in the unfolding of less/more 
appropriate institutions. 
 
Another model predicts that the ruling elites are more prone to weaken property rights if 
appropriable natural resource rents exist (Olsson & Congdon Fors 2007). The model expect 
that appropriable natural resource rents are proceeds from a state controlled natural resource 
sector, the revenues are assumed to flow into the governmental budget (Olsson & Congdon 
Fors 2007:1904). The ruling elite has an economic interest in the formal sector, but can attain 
rents from the natural resource sector. Strong property rights make the formal sector flourish. 
Weak property rights lead to a poorly functioned formal economy, but it makes the attainment 
of resource rents easier. The more available natural resource rents are, the more likely the 
ruling elite would choose weak property rights (Olsson & Congdon Fors 2007:1897).  
 
The affiliation between elites and natural resources has also been stressed through institutions 
of extraction and redistribution in the case of Angola. Firstly, the institutions of extraction 
consist of petroleum companies, ministries of finance, tax authorities, the central bank and the 
ruling party (Amundsen 2014:172). In Angola, the institutions of extraction turned grabber 
friendly and not accountable (Amundsen 2014:184). Secondly, the institutions of 
redistribution involve power sharing, checks and balances, and accountability. The parliament 
and judiciary are vital in this aspect (Amundsen 2014:172). If the institutions of redistribution 
do not control the institutions of extraction the consequence could induce the elite to turn 
grabber friendly and not accountable. In Angola, the institutions of redistribution are weak, 
inefficient and sidelined by the president and the ruling elite (Amundsen 2014:178). 
 
Rosenberg & Birdzell (2008) emphasize the importance of institutions to reward and allow 
innovation (Norman 2008). Another approach that has been discussed to a large extent is the 
work of Mehlum et al. (2006). They present important work on institutions and claim that 
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resource abundant countries with good institutions/producer friendly institutions receive 
higher growth than resource abundant countries with bad institutions/grabber friendly 
institutions. The article has been criticized for its measurements. Boshini et al. (2007) were 
skeptical of the measurement of Mehlum et al. (2006), as they believe that the quality of 
institutions needs to be put in relation to a country’s type of resources. According to their 
argument, institutions matter if the type of resources is appropriate.  
 
Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) conceptualize institutions in two different types – grabber 
friendly institutions, where rent seeking and production are competing activities, while rent 
seeking and production in producer friendly institutions are complementary activities. In the 
grabber friendly institutions, there are gains from specialization in unproductive influence 
activities such as rent extraction, caused by poor bureaucracy, weak rule of law and 
corruption (Mehlum et al 2006:3-4).  Resource abundance attracts scarce entrepreneurial 
resources out of production and into unproductive activities. With producer friendly 
institutions this would not happen, as resources attract entrepreneurs into production, which 
leads to a higher growth (Mehlum et al 2006:3). The idea that institutions matter for economic 
growth among natural resource abundant countries, challenge the economic explanations and 
the idea of the Dutch disease, as it suggests that exposed countries can turn the resource curse 
into a blessing. The countries are not only dependent on the effect of certain sectors and the 
negative consequences of natural resources (and the booms). Mehlum et al. (2006) measure 
institutional quality through a set of indexes centered on rule of law, bureaucratic quality, 
corruption in government, risk of expropriation index and a government repudiation of 
contracts (Mehlum et al 2006:13).  
 
Boschini et al. (2007) argue that institutions matter, not in the way Mehlum et al. (2006) 
points out, but together with something they call appropriable resources. With technical 
appropriability, the authors refer to resources that cause a certain appropriative behavior – 
valuable resources that are easily transported, smuggled and sold are more attractive to short 
term illegitimate profits. Institutional appropriability refers to the effect of resources on 
certain types of quality of institutions. Problematic resources are more likely to boost the 
economy of a country with good institutions, rather than a country with bad institutions 
(Boschini et al 2007:594). The more problematic resources a country has, the more important 
it is to have good institutions in order to perform well (Boschini et al 2007).  
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According to Andersen & Aslaksen (2007), concerns should be raised with measures of 
institutional quality, as institutional performance indicators probably are endogenous to 
growth, and it is unclear exactly which elements of institutional quality are important for 
economic growth (Andersen & Aslaksen 2007:228). What do they mean with endogenous to 
growth? It is sometimes argued that institutions are endogenous, meaning that they are the 
result of economic growth rather than the cause of the growth. The authors control for several 
indicators, and find evidence that constitutional design matters for the resource curse. The 
curse is accordingly present more in presidential countries as well as in non-democratic 
regimes, but not in democratic parliamentary countries. The reason for this is not that 
apparent in the discussion. The discussion is, however, set on the idea that presidential forms 
of government are associated with less rent extraction and lower levels of taxation than 
parliamentary forms of government. The fear of a government crisis in parliamentary regimes 
creates strong incentives to maintain party discipline (Andersen & Aslaksen 2007:230). The 
reason could be that institutional quality differs within constitutions, as the authors admit that 
institutional quality is better in parliamentary countries (Andersen & Aslaksen 2007:233).  
 
Political and institutional aspects are less apparent in previous research, but gained 
importance after the prominent contribution from Mehlum et al. (2006). I continue this section 
by a simple presentation of the mechanisms around constraints on executive which is a rather 
new variable that previous research has not examined to a large degree. I then discuss some 
aspects of QoG. 
 
If we first look at constraints on executive, the idea is that natural resources function better in 
countries with strong constraints on the executive, than in countries with weak constrains on 
executives and is inspired by Acemoglu & Robinson (2001). The authors did not test it with 
resource abundance (Acemoglu & Robinsons 2001). Why would constraints on executive be 
profitable for countries? With strong constraints, the executive power might not be able to act 
without the assistance of other auditing sections.  If there are competing institutions that hold 
veto power, executives might avoid risky policies (Allen & Beardsley 2005:5). Executives 
might find it more difficult to act in their own interest and personal gains if there are 
institutions auditing the executive branch. In a resource rich environment, with no constraints 
on executive, it could be that the distribution of income benefits a certain elite of society, 
perhaps the executive part. The example of a sub-Saharan country illustrates the problems. 
The president of Angola serves as the head of the state, government, army, and ruling party, 
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holds extensive power over nominations and faces few constraints. The president can dissolve 
the parliament, but the parliament cannot dismiss the president – the president is also at the 
top of the rich list in Angola (Amundsen 2014:176). This can explain why Angola is trapped 
in the resource curse and experiences immense economic/political problems.  
Executive constraints are also highlighted in Lederman and Maloney’s article (2008): “In 
search for the missing resource curse” where they put forward critical arguments against the 
curse. They explore the institutions by using constraints on executive as the main institutional 
factor. The authors have, in previous papers, been critical about the existence of the resource 
curse and find now that the growth effects of natural resources are conditional, hence arguing 
against the existence of a resource curse. It is, in their view, dependent on other factors such 
as institutional quality, management and coordination (Lederman & Maloney 2008:48). My 
concern about their way of using executive constraints is that they consider measuring 
institutional quality with this variable. I am not sure if constraints of executive should be used 
as the key institutional variable as the variable measures how independent an executive is, but 
does not involve other important institutional factors. I explain this in the QoG discussion 
below. They do not make any clear arguments for why executive on constraints is used to 
measure institutional quality, and they also fail to discuss the mechanisms around it. I believe 
that institutional quality shall also contain other elements, and that executive constraints can 
be used as an extension, which also highlights the importance of this aspect.  
 
QoG is a concept that could be applied to understand institutional – and governmental quality. 
Rothstein & Teorell (2008) define QoG “as the idea that democracy in the form of political 
equality on the input side must be complemented with impartiality on the output side of the 
political system, in the exercise of public authority” (Rothstein & Teorell 2008:170). QoG is 
the exercise of power and not the access to power. They highlight impartiality as a key word, 
and their definition suggests that “when implementing laws and policies, government officials 
shall not take into consideration anything about citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated 
in the policy or law” (Ibid).  QoG or quality of institutions? First of all, these two concepts are 
very closely related and some scholars would perhaps argue it is the same thing. I discuss 
these two as I have encountered a more precise definition of QoG with clear dimensions. 
When it comes to quality of institutions, some scholars use the framework to capture one or a 
few institutional dimensions (Lederman & Maloney 2008), while others capture many 
dimensions (Kauffman et al 2008). Second, with the QoG definition produced by Rothstein 
and Teorell, there are at least two clear distinctions between QoG and the use of institutional 
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quality in the aspect of natural resources. A) The rule of law has been used in examining 
institutional quality (see Kolstad 2009, Norman 2008). The classical use of rule of law has 
been abandoned in Rothstein and Teorells definition as they argue it lacks proper definition 
and consists of ambiguous elements (Rothstein & Teorell 2008:181). They further believe the 
use of rule of law is incorporated in their definition, as “no one is above the law”, and that an 
impartial government institution would embrace this notion (Rothstein & Teorell 2008:182). 
B) There are not always clear divisions between institutions and democracy. Sometimes, it 
remains rather unclear what institutional variables measure, and if democracy is a part of the 
framework or not. In the QoG discussion, Rothstein and Teorell conclude that there are both 
theoretical and empirical reasons for why democracy is not part of the QoG definition. There 
are no guarantees that the majority will respect the impartiality principle, and there is no 
simple relationship between “democracy in the access to public power and impartiality in the 
exercise of public power” (Rothstein & Teorell 2008:178-179).  
 
The concentration on QoG contributes to the existing research. The research focuses on 
certain models such as grabber versus producer friendly institutions, rule of law, or 
institutions in relation to types of resources as explained in this chapter, but not a fully 
extended version, in the way QoG constitutes and is defined. It is therefore important to 
account additional aspects on the institutional spectrum. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
In the previous section I have presented a review of the explanations related to the curse and 
attempted an  appraisal and critique. In this section I present the hypotheses that will be tested 
in order a) to provide an updated test of the resource curse as such and b) to extend this 
research by taking into account the theoretical and methodological concerns that have been 
expressed above especially as regards the quality of institutions, the political regime type and 
the constraints on executives. 
As it is clear from the text above, the very existence of the curse is contested in the literature. 
As such the “baseline” hypotheses in this thesis are as follows. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Natural resource abundance leads to decreasing economic growth. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Natural resources abundance leads to increasing economic growth. 
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In the economic part the discussion was positioned on the Dutch disease, rent seeking and 
primary versus manufactured goods. I have argued that the first two have been vital in the 
literature, but that the third is of less importance. The present study is inspired by Sachs & 
Warner’s seminal article “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth” and aims to 
test the main findings in that paper with more sophisticated methods and an updated dataset. 
One of the variables they use is openness, which I will also test. This might capture a part of 
the Dutch disease explanation, as it is believed that resource abundant countries become less 
competitive due to an appreciation of their currency. The outcome of openness to trade would 
consequently not be as notable. A concern with some parts of this literature is describing the 
resource curse as a fact (Sachs & Warner 1995a, 1997). The question of how resource 
abundant countries should manage their resources to avoid the curse is therefore somewhat 
overlooked. If there are exceptions, could there not be a way to avoid it?  
 
One hypothesis will be tested from the economic part: 
Hypothesis 3: Increasing openness to trade leads to increasing economic growth. 
 
One concern in this study is that it does not involve enough economic indicators. The models 
in previous research are often based on equations and extensive models. I would have 
problems in bringing something new to the research in establishing new or modify other 
economic models. My focus in the analysis is therefore on political-institutional explanations 
as this is the “new or recent” aspect of my research.  
 
The political and institutional section reviewed previous research on institutions and political 
systems. One of my main concerns was the lack of operationalization on the institutional 
variable, on which I aimed to provide a more sufficient explanation with the use of QoG. In 
Mehlum et al. (2006), the focus is on creating an adequate model, but the discussion of what 
institutional quality is, and how it affects growth in relation to natural resources, is not that 
evident. Another ambitious model is presented by Boshini et al. (2007) which puts institutions 
in relation to types of natural resources. I am not convinced that the types of resources are 
totally decisive, even though it sometimes might be part of the matter. My overall 
understanding is that quality of institutions matter, despite the type of resources in resource 
abundant countries, and evidence from Mehlum et al. (2006) and the discussion about the 
success story of Botswana supports this claim. It can also be subject to political systems 
which Andersen & Aslaksen (2008) argue. Issues could however be raised regarding political 
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systems, and the institutional quality in each respective system. Political systems and 
institutions are closely connected and it is a known belief that institutions are worse in 
presidential systems (Gerring et al 2009:327). 
 
Three hypotheses will be tested from the political – institutional section: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Natural resource abundance leads to increasing economic growth in countries 
that have a parliamentary political system. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Natural resource abundance leads to increasing economic growth in countries 
that have high quality of institutions. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Natural resource abundance leads to increasing economic growth in countries 
with constraints on executives. 
 
The research question - Why might resource abundance hurt rather than help a country’s 
economy, and how can resource abundant countries receive higher growth? – has been 
designed from my criticisms of previous literature. There are, nevertheless, aspects that are 
not fully discussed. In the next section two of these are briefly approached. 
2.3 Democracy and Corruption 
This thesis sets out to understand and explain a few factors’ impact on economic growth. 
Democracy is a factor that is not tested in this analysis. The QoG discussion would suggest it 
is not democracy that leads to growth, but QoG (see previous QoG discussion). The idea of 
democracy’s impact on growth is also contested. Some authors point to the evidence that 
several authoritarian regimes perform better than some democratic regimes (Keefer 2007). 
Others say that we do not have a certain answer to this question (Przeworski & Limongi). 
Keefer (2007) believes that it is a matter of young or old democracies, and claims that young 
democracies are often more fractionalized, and have more incentives to choose the “wrong” 
option than older democracies (Keefer 2007:814). That might be a reason why young 
democracies fail. Another view is that democracy is good for growth. Olsson also approaches 
the time aspect, but in a different way. Olsson argues that an authoritarian regime might have 
successful growth for a generation or so – if a strong dictator created good economic policies 
– but that only democracies would reach growth over generations since they would be less 
dependent on the consequences (successes or failures) of a leader (Olsson 1993:572).  
Another topic that has not been emphasized is corruption which is included in the QoG 
variable. It is believed that corruption can fuel political instability through polarization, 
inequality and impropriety, as corruption attacks the foundation of democratic systems. 
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Instability is therefore empirically said to reduce growth (Hodge 2011:4). Corruption can, 
however, also be good for growth in some aspects. The two channels of government size and 
trade openness are said to foster growth by reducing government consumption and increasing 
trade openness (Hodge 2011:3). There are several scholars who find that corruption hinders 
economic growth (Tanzi 1998; Gupta et all 2008, Rock & Bonnet 2004; Pelegrini & Gerlagh 
2004), and they argue that the effects of corruption are limited. Johnson et al. (2007) find 
through their measurement that corruption does not seem to prevent growth, even though it 
might be problematic for many countries (Johnson et al 2007:25). Mendez and Sepulveda 
(2006) find that corruption has a positive impact on growth in the long run, at low levels of 
incidence (Hodge 2011:2).  
 
There are many aspects of growth to account for, in which I have had to make a decision on 
what to include. This study deals with other possible explanations then discussed in this 
section, because I have found them more plausible for the analysis and the intention of the 
study.  
3 Data and Method 
3.1 Data  
The analysis covers 43 countries (see the list of countries in Appendix A) and the years of 
analysis is between 1984-2010. Some concerns can be raised with some variables that are not 
well distributed, namely GDP growth, which is dealt with a log of GDP. Furthermore, the 
dataset has been balanced. See appendix A for full variable descriptions. 
 
A growth variable has been computed by the lag of GDP per capita for each observation of 
GDP per capita. The log of GDP growth is used as the dependent variable, and the data has 
been gathered from the World Bank’s indicator of GDP per capita, ppp (constant international 
dollars. 
 
The main independent variable is natural resource exports. The definition of resource 
abundance in Sachs & Warner’s study is “resource wealth”, and the measurement to 
distinguish abundance is the share of primary exports in GDP (Sachs & Warner 1995a). The 
variable to distinguish resource abundance follows the same distinction. To distinguish 
natural resources, this study has generated a variable from World Development Indicators for 
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agricultural exports, ores & metals exports, and fuel exports (appendix A). The variables 
measure exports in percent of merchandise exports. The higher the percentages, the more 
resource abundance. The analysis covers a large extent of natural resources with these 
variables. One problem is that more resources should be covered in the variable, such as 
mineral abundance. There are countries that are highly dependent on precious stones and 
minerals which will not be covered completely. Due to limitations in the data found in WDI, 
this is expected for the use of this particular variable. Other resources and minerals are 
unfortunately not measured in exports.  
The natural resource variable has been differenced in this study since a Breitung Unit-Root 
test indicates that it is not behaving in a stationary manner (see Figure 1 In appendix B), the 
value is not significant which is an indication that the data is not stationary. 
 
The QoG, ICRG will be the model’s main institutional measurement. It is the mean value of 
ICRG variables “corruption”, “law & order”, “bureaucracy quality”, scaled 0-1, with 1 
indicating higher QoG. These are also aspects that measure the institutional strength, such as 
the quality of bureaucracy and judicial system.  
 
Regime type/political system is used as an indicator of the type of political system. It is 
written as both political system and regime type in the text. The index takes several questions 
into consideration before labeling countries (see a more precise explanation at QoG codebook 
2013:170). It measures 0=“presidential”, 1=“strong presidential elected by assembly”, 
2=“parliamentary”. The database of political system has collected the data and is available in 
QoG database. 
 
Constraints on executive is taken from the political constraints index III. The index ranges 
from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating more constraints (see QoG codebook 2013:223). 
The variable measures political constraints. Another variable measured constraints on 
executive but the scale was more problematic so I decided to use political constraints.  
 
Openness measures openness to trade and is collected by Penn World Table (PWT). Openness 
calculated as the total trade (exports+imports) as a percentage of GDP. (See appendix A for a 
full explanations of the variables) 
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3.2 Control variables 
Structural 
There are other variables that have been included in the models, a few of them account for 
structural elements. One of these is ethnic fractionalization. Previous research suggests that 
countries with many rival groups have more intensified conflicts. Also in highly fractionalized 
societies weaker property rights make productive activities less attractive, and are due to a 
decrease in aggregate production (Hodler 2006:1368). Another way in which structural 
factors can influence economic growth is the aspect of dismemberment (ethnic split between 
borders) which could lead to a greater ethnical disparity with possible economic stagnation as 
a consequence (Engelbert et al 2002:1113). 
The indicator for ethnic fractionalization measures was used by Fearon, in his article “Ethnic 
and cultural diversity by country” in 2003. The content has been gathered from Stanford. The 
intermediate organization of the scale is 0=perfectly homogenous and 1=highly fragmented 
(QoG 20dec 2013:199).  
 
Sachs and Warner examine the effects of geography by using four geography and climate 
variables; percent of land area within 100 kilometers of the sea; kilometers to the closest 
major port; the fraction of land area in the geographic tropics and a malaria index – and find 
that geographical variables do not eliminate evidence for the resource curse (Sachs & Warner 
2001:830). Another scholar argues that countries benefit from being smaller, even though he 
does not examine resource abundance (Alesina 2003:308).  
The geographical aspect will be examined with the size of population. 
The size of population is a PWT variable and measures population in thousands (QoG 
codebook 2013:313). 
 
Structural explanations such as these seem to be rather limited in the resource curse literature, 
in both theoretical models and empirical results. I therefore suspect less impact by structural 
variables. It might be that some scholars are directing focus on other than geographical 
variables. Education is another variable that focus has been put on. In the literature, at least 
three mechanisms have been addressed. First, an economy develops human capital from 
education and other types of training. Human capital improves workers’ productivity which 
would cause economic growth (Behbudi et al 2010:84). Second, education might increase the 
innovative capacity of the economy, create new awareness of products and technologies that 
promote growth (Behbudi et al 2010:84). Third, education can help a transformation from 
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older to newer processes/technologies and also initiate a better implementation of these 
(Hanushek & Wössmann 2010:245). More and improved education is elementary for rapid 
economic development and can also be helpful in resource abundant environments (Gylfason 
2001:851). 
Education, average schooling 25+ men and female, measured in years. This variable is 
thought to cover the education aspect.  
 
Most of the data has been collected from the QoG time series cross sectional dataset, updated 
in December 2013.  
3.3 Method 
This study applies multiple regression analysis. The primary focus is positioned on the 
variables covering the hypothesis, and especially the aspects of QoG, constraints on executive 
and political system. The regression analysis is a way of predicting an outcome variable from 
one or several predictor variables and to understand possible relationships (Field 2013:198). 
The analysis cover aspects from previous literature but the data on the variables in the 
multiple regressions do not involve more than 43 countries and ideally it would involve more 
cases. Field (2013) assert that the accuracy of a model is based on two questions, 1) does the 
model fit the observed data well? 2) Can the model be generalized to other samples? (Field 
2013:214). Apprehension of the results and generalization will be further explored in the 
analysis section. 
 
The regression equation - Y=a+bx+e – represents the dependent variable (Y), the intercept 
(a), the slope coefficient/ (b), the independent variables (x) and the residual (e) which is the 
variation in the model that the independent variables cannot explain (Ibid). The main focal 
relationship in this thesis is the effect of natural resource exports (independent variable) on 
GDP growth (dependent variable) which has been established by previous literature. The 
significant level between 0,01 and 0,1 will be used in the analysis to sort out if the regression 
coefficients are statistically significant.  
 
The estimation of the regressions is performed by the statistical software program Stata. The 
program makes it easier and possible to deal with time series cross sectional data. The 
advantage of using Stata is that it consists of a command syntax which makes it easy to save 
the regression analysis and to receive quick results.  
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The methodological issues of concern for this study are namely three components. The first 
part is longitudinal research which involves data across time periods. The second is the 
distinction between random effects and fixed effects models. The third is the introduction of 
interaction effects. I will briefly introduce these three parts but not go into details.  
 
In order to examine the resource curse and test different explanations, the choice of method is 
important. The thesis will involve data from 1980s onwards in most cases. As data availability 
is an issue here. The analysis will also contain all available countries. The choice of method is 
longitudinal research, because the analysis involves time periods. The use of cross sectional 
data only and not cross sectional time series data (e.g. Sachs & Warner 1995a; 1997 Gylfason 
1999; 2001;) has been criticized. In the past, Manzano & Rigobon (2001) argue that the use of 
cross sectional data and GDP as independent variable may have had an impact on the 
coefficients and this might imply that Sachs and Warner (1995a) overlooked time series 
variation (Manzano & Rigobon 2001:2). In this analysis, changes in GDP (GDP growth) will 
be used as the dependent variable.  
 
The primary purpose of longitudinal research is to be able to describe patterns of change and 
to set a direction of causality (Menard 2002:3). There are two basic methods when it comes to 
the analysis: fixed effects models and random effects models. The analysis is performed with 
random effects models. 
 
This study deals with interaction effects. The advantage of dealing with interaction is the 
possibility to understand one independent (X) variable’s impact on the dependent variable (Y) 
when another independent variable (Z) is absent, or present which the equation below 
illustrates (Brambor et al 2006:65).  
 
     +  X+  Z+  XZ +e 
 
B3 specifies the conditional nature of the model. In this study I am interested in examining 
three hypotheses that capture interaction terms, QoG, regime type and constraints on 
executive. These variables are considered as Z in the interaction equation and could be 
understood as conditional in nature. The resource curse literature is divided when it comes to 
the use of interaction effects but the most notable discussion in the political-institutional part 
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are from studies that employ interactions (Mehlum et al 2006; Boshini et al 2007; Andersen & 
Aslaksen 2008).  
4 Analysis 
The analysis is presented through random effects models First of all, a simple regression 
model is performed to see if there is any correlation, and a potential resource curse. The main 
independent variable has been differenced, as the Breitung Unit-Root test estimates that the 
variable has a unit root. The test for Breitung Unit Root was not significant which could be 
interpreted as an indication that there are signs of non stationarity. The test assumed that 
“time trance” - values for a variable always tend to increase each year and therefore correlates 
with other variables that are decreasing/increasing over time – was not a problem for the 
“Resource Abundance (resource exports)” variable. 
 
The first regression presents a significant positive effect which does not indicate a curse. The 
effect on GDP growth is + 4.1 with one unit increase of resource abundance.  
 
Table 1. Restricted model, with estimate of the resource curse effect 
Dependent: log GDP Growth Table 1 
    
dif.Resource Abundance 4.163 *** 
 
(1.61) 
. 
 Intercept 201.6*** 
 
(21.1) 
R2 0.04 
Countries 
Observations 
152 
3006 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
The second table is a very simplified version of Sachs and Warner’s original model with 
resource abundance, trade and education included. The direction of resource abundance is 
negative but it is not significant. The other variables are significant and indicate an expected 
positive direction. 
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Table 2. Simplified replication of S&W’s model. 
 
Dependent: log GDP Growth Table 2  
  S&W replication 
dif.Resource Abundance -1.27 (12.1) 
Openness to Trade 5.48(2.0)** 
Education 60.8(12.1)*** 
Intecept 
 
-384 (1385)*** 
R2  0.35 
Countries 
Observations 
 43 
258 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
 
In table 3 I run random effect models with the main predictors. In model 1, resource 
abundance has a positive and significant effect of 12.9 on log of GDP growth, which is the 
opposite of what we would initially expect from the resource curse argument. Regime type 
and executive constraints are not significant. The QoG variable has a strong and positive 
effect indicating that higher QoG leads to an increase in GDP growth. 
 
The second model includes control variables and the effect of regime type, QoG and 
executive constraints are not significant. Openness to trade has a significant and positive 
effect of 5.5 on growth. Education also specifies a significant positive effect on growth. The 
coefficient for ethnic fractionalization is significant and negative which means that more 
homogenous countries are more likely to reach higher growth in this model. These predictors 
follow the expected direction. The overall model explains about 39 percent of the variance 
and the intercept is at -409. The political-institutional variables do not hold a significant effect 
when control variables are included. 
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Table 3. Regression with main coefficients and control variables  
  
Table 3 
   Dependent: Log GDP Growth Model 1 … Model 2 
    … 
 dif.Resource Abundance 12.9(4.4)*** 
 
4.09 (11.9) 
    Regime Type 102.69(78.5) 
 
38.0 (129.9) 
QoG 512.5 (119.5)*** 379.9 (239.9) 
Executive Constraints -152.8(149.1) 
 
12.8 (146.8) 
 
Openness to Trade 
  
5.5 (1.8)*** 
Education 
  
37.8 (16.7)** 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
  
-306.6 (174.4)* 
Population 
  
0.0002(0.0) 
    Intercept -22.2 (66.2) 
 
-409.5(191.)** 
    R2 0.07   0.39 
Countries 
Observations 
43 
1160   
43 
258 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
    
 
In table 4a, I proceed by including the interactions specified by each of my hypothesis. The 
first model includes the first interaction term between regime type and resource abundance. 
Resource abundance is not significant and is a concern for the interaction. The regime type 
dummy has a positive effect on GDP growth when resources are zero. The interesting result 
from this model is the significant interaction effect which predicts 32.1 unit increase on 
growth in parliamentarian countries. The coefficient for parliamentarian countries is 36.6 
(4.5+32.1). Figure 1 illustrates this linear relation. 
 
In the second model, the second interaction term is included, which is between resource 
abundance and QoG. The evidence provides interesting result about QoG and the resource 
curse. For the first time in the analysis, is there a significant effect of a resource curse, which 
is conditioned by QoG. In other words, resource abundance has a 26.9 negative effect on log 
of GDP growth in countries with low QoG. The interaction term for QoG indicates a 
significant 74.2 stronger effect in countries with high QoG. The effect of resource abundance 
in high QoG countries is 47.3. Figure 2 illustrates this linear relation. 
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Furthermore, the interaction term for executive constraints was not significant and is explored 
in figure 3. In the third model I include all interactions and control variables and the first thing 
to note is that the interaction effects no longer are significant even though the directions of 
these variables are in line with theory. The limited number of cases might be one reason for 
why the effect is not there.  This suggests a weakening of my model and the effects of QoG 
and regime type because the effect does not hold with control variables. The variables for 
QoG, openness to trade, education and ethnic fractionalization are significant but the main 
independent variable is not significant. Openness to trade has a significant effect of 5.4 on log 
GDP growth with one unit increase of openness which suggests that openness is important for 
growth. Education has a significant effect of 36.6 and ethnic fractionalization has a significant 
negative effect -292 on log of GDP growth. This means that more years of education and 
more homogenous countries have a significant correlation on log of GDP which is in line with 
theory. 
 
Multicollinearity could be an issue for the full model (3) and if VIF values for variables are 
over 10, it could be problematic for the model. In appendix B figure 2, the test for 
multicollinearity is presented for model 3 in table 4, with high VIF values for the variables of 
natural resource exports and interaction for QoG, indicating some concerns. The VIF values 
for model 2 (figure 3, B) are all below 10 which indicates less concerns with multicollinearity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
Table 4a. Interaction effects with main coefficients  
 
Table 4 
Dependent: Log GDP Growth Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
          
 dif.Resource Abundance 4.5 (3.6) 
 
-26.9 (10.4)*** -19.6 (25.7) 
      Regime Type 252.8 (62.8)*** 
  
23.3 (137.2) 
QoG 
  
650.8 (104.8)*** 411 (240)* 
Executive Constraints 
    
-3.4 (155.8) 
      Interaction 1 32.1 (7.1)*** 
   
9.4 (28.7) 
Interaction 2 
  
74.2 (19.4)*** 21.1 (66.4) 
Interaction 3 
    
20.1 (32) 
      Openness to Trade 
    
5.4 (1.8)*** 
Education 
    
36.6 (17.1)** 
Ethnic Fractionalization 
    
-292.9 (172.5)* 
Population 
    
.0002 (.0001) 
      Intercept 189.76 (40.1)*** -119.1 (49.0)** -416.9 (193.4)** 
      R2 0.005   0.08   0.4 
Countries 
Observations 
43 
1160   
43 
1160   
43 
258 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
   
Comments: Interaction 1: Regime Type multiplied with total natural resource exports. Interaction 2: QoG 
multiplied with total natural resource exports. Interaction 3: Constraints on Executive multiplied with total 
natural resource exports. Sources: QoG standard database December 2013. World Development Indicators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Figure 1. Interaction effect between political system and resources on growth 
 
 
The graph for figure 1 illustrates the marginal effect of differentiated resource abundance on 
GDP, when it’s conditioned by political system, parliamentarian or presidential. Countries 
that are parliamentarian (1) are more likely to benefit from their resources than countries that 
are presidential (0). Note that the curse is not evident in this graph in either political system. 
The difference is however large, about 5 percent in presidential countries to about 35 percent 
in parliamentarian countries which suggests that parliamentarian countries are more 
successful with their resources. 
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Figure 2. Interaction effect between QoG and resources on growth 
 
 
The graph for figure 2 demonstrates the marginal effect of differentiated resource abundance 
on GDP, conditioned by QoG. Countries with low QoG are trapped in the curse while 
countries with high QoG experience a positive effect on growth according to the analysis. 
Countries with less than about .4 of QoG show 0 or a negative effect of resource abundance. 
Countries with higher than .4 show a rising effect on growth. The countries with QoG lower 
than 2 have an effect of around -20 percent on GDP by their natural resources. 
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Figure 3. Interaction effect between Constraints on executive and resources on 
growth 
 
Figure 3 presents the marginal effect of differentiated resource abundance on GDP; when 
constraints on executive is conditioned. The effect is not significant and not evident for this 
variable. 
 
The final table (4b) includes control variables for each interaction, to examine if the effect for 
regime type and QoG holds with control variables. The results indicate that the effect is 
weaker and not significant for the interactions of regime type, QoG and executive constraints 
when control variables are included. The QoG variable is the only explanatory variable that 
estimates a significant effect but the interaction and the main independent variables are not 
significant. There are 258 observations which are only about a fourth of the observations for 
the interactions (4a) without control variables. Even though the effect diminishes with control 
variables, the overall conclusion from the tables is that high QoG is important. The result 
indicates that countries with high QoG can avoid the resource curse but it is not entirely 
supported in this analysis.  
 
 
 
 
Mean of Political Constraints Index III
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
M
a
rg
in
a
l E
ff
e
ct
 o
f 
d
if_
e
xp
o
n
 d
_
g
d
p
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Political Constraints Index III
Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.
30 
 
Table 4b. Interactions with control variables 
Table 4b. 
Dependent: Log GDP 
Growth Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
          
 dif.Resource Abundance -2.6 (10.3) 
 
--18.6 (22.3) --8.1(13.4) 
      Regime Type 111.3 (106.5) 
   QoG 
  
436.9 (184.7)**   
Executive Constraints 
    
26.3 (144.5) 
      Interaction 1 13.5 (19.2) 
    Interaction 2 
  
40.9 (37.8) 
 Interaction 3 
    
25.6(36.2) 
      Openness to Trade 5.4(1.9)*** 
 
5.5(1.7)*** 
 
5.7 (1.9)*** 
Education 50.1(15.4)*** 
 
35.9(16.5)** 
 
56.3 (12.8)*** 
Ethnic Fractionalization -351.(167.7)** 
 
-
301.5(170.6)* 
 
-408.8 (165.3)** 
Population .00002(.0) 
 
.0002(.0) 
 
.0002 (.0) 
      Intercept -261. (164.3) -422.1 (166.0)** -259.2 (172.4)** 
      R2 0.3   0.4   0.37 
Countries 
Observations 
43 
258   
43 
258   
43 
258 
 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
   
Comments: Interaction 1: Regime Type multiplied with total natural resource exports. Interaction 2: QoG 
multiplied with total natural resource exports. Interaction 3: Constraints on Executive multiplied with total 
natural resource exports. Sources: QoG standard database December 2013. World Development Indicators. 
 
 
 
 
Six hypotheses were established in the theory section and I will evaluate these based on the 
results that have been processed from the regression tables. The first two hypotheses derive 
from the general section: 
Hypothesis 1: Natural resource abundance leads to decreasing economic growth. 
Hypothesis 2: Natural resource abundance leads to increasing economic growth. 
 
For the first hypothesis, I expected to see a negative relation of resource abundance but this 
was not evident in my models except for the interactions so the results do not support 
hypothesis 1. The second hypothesis was statistically significant in 3 of my models and the 
results support hypothesis 2, stating that natural resource abundance leads to increasing 
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economic growth. There are some issues with these hypotheses because the effect does not 
seem to more than the first but it the effect is not particularly strong. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Countries more open to trade experience increasing economic growth. 
The third hypothesis capture the openness to trade aspect on growth and it showed a 
significant positive effect which means that the analysis support this hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Natural resource abundance leads to increasing economic growth in countries 
that have a parliamentary political system. 
Hypothesis 5: Natural resource abundance leads to increasing economic growth in countries 
that have high quality of institutions. 
Hypothesis 6: Natural resource abundance leads to increasing economic growth in countries 
with constraints on executives. 
 
Three hypotheses from the political-institutional section were established to test if these 
variables have any effect on the curse. The variable for political system had a significant and 
positive effect in one interaction but the variable for differentiated resource abundance was 
not significant which makes the hypothesis less trustworthy. The results do not fully support 
the hypothesis for this sample and the graph does not show any negative effect of being 
parliamentarian or presidential, in other words, the curse is never evident in this interaction. 
Hypothesis 5 captured the QoG aspect and the results in the interaction supported the 
hypothesis as resource abundant countries with high QoG has a significant and positive effect 
on growth. The curse is evident in countries with low QoG. The results presented in the 
second interaction model support hypothesis 5, but the effect is not significant with control 
variables so it is not entirely supported. The results for constraints on executive do not support 
hypothesis 6 as the effect was not significant or positive. The effect should perhaps be 
stronger and evident for more cases in order to do a confident generalization. 
 
The effect of a curse and the interaction variables are not particularly strong in the full model 
or with control variables, which means that further research will have to determine if 
especially QoG and executive constraints have a stronger effect in other samples. Research 
including interactions is the way forward, because it is not only interesting to distinguish the 
existence of a potential curse, but also examine why some countries experience a curse while 
others a blessing. This study highlights the importance of interactions due to the fact that the 
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curse was not apparent until the QoG interaction was included. Further research should also 
attempt to test if QoG and executive constraints have stronger effect in a larger sample. As 
previously mentioned, research involving panel data has provided less evidence for a curse 
than cross country analysis, and the results in this thesis also raise concern for the curse as “an 
empirical fact”. 
5 Conclusion 
Resource abundant countries are said to be trapped in a curse. Recent research has, however, 
raised concerns about the evidence of such a curse. This analysis has aimed to cover over 40 
countries across 16 years to examine the curse with political-institutional variables.  
 
The primary reasons for this study have been to a) contribute with an up-to-date research on 
the topic, as much of the previous literature examines older time spans and b) distinguish 
political-institutional variables and QoG as important features, which has not been especially 
noticeable in the literature. The overall motivation for this study was to be able to give 
explanations of the resource curse context. This has been done with an extensive literature 
review where the most important contributions in the field have been discussed. The aim was 
also to discuss possible “new” explanations, which has been considered through QoG and 
constraints on executives. Much of the inspiration and interest in the resource curse has 
originally derived from the works of the Norwegian scholar Ragnar Torvik. 
 
The research question for this thesis was “why might resource abundance hurt rather than help 
a country’s economy, and how can resource abundant countries receive higher growth?” The 
first part of the research question has had many answers, which the literature review has 
aimed to cover. There are economical factors such as the Dutch disease and rent seeking, 
which help in giving an understanding to a resource rich context where a resource boom can 
lead to problematic outcomes. This analysis has, however, put more focus on more recent 
ideas; that it is the lack of quality of institutions or low QoG that could be the conditional 
factor behind a curse. Consequently, the answer given from this analysis on how countries 
receive higher growth is through high QoG. The aspect of QoG measures whether resource 
abundant countries are conditioned by QoG when it comes to increasing or decreasing effect 
on growth. The results from this thesis indicate that the curse only is evident and significant 
when it is conditioned by QoG. Countries with low QoG are more likely to be trapped by the 
curse, while countries with high QoG are likely to experience higher growth. The effect does 
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not hold with control variables but there are indications that QoG is important. The results of 
this thesis are therefore not entirely as strong as one could hope for, and I believe that 
covering more than 43 countries would be optimal for further research. Many Sub-Saharan 
African countries have been important for previous analysis, but due to lack of data, countries 
from this region are not involved in the analysis. This aspect also concerns the lack of 
“developing” countries in the analysis. The resource curse is sometimes described as a 
problem of “developing” countries, but this thesis has not put much emphasis to distinguish it 
in the analysis. 
 
More research on the topic should aim to examine the effect in a larger database with more 
observations, to see if the effect holds with control variables. Further research should also 
examine the indicators with fixed effects to observe if there is a relationship, and if it is 
stronger or weaker with fixed effects. Furthermore, I would also suggest supplementary 
qualitative case studies with the aspects of QoG and constraints on executive included. The 
resource curse literature mainly involves quantitative research but more information could be 
derived from case studies. 
 
This thesis has provided concerns for Sachs & Warner’s statement that “empirical studies 
have shown that this curse is a reasonably solid fact. It is not easily explained by other 
variables or by alternative ways to measure resource abundance” (Sachs & Warner 2001:837). 
In this study, the effect of a curse is not evident, and it is explained through alternative 
variables. There is no significant effect of a curse, but instead some evidence of a blessing.  
This is an attempt to bring something new to the resource curse literature and I believe that 
this study has highlighted the importance of looking at QoG and applying panel data methods. 
Also, examining conditional effects is a good way forward. This analysis puts some concerns 
to the classical resource curse argument stating that resource rich countries will experience 
negative growth rates. According to this study, it is not natural resources that lead a country 
into a curse, but the lack of high Quality of Government. 
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Appendix A 
 
The countries of analysis 
 
Africa 
Algeria – Egypt – Morocco – Tunisia  
 
Asia 
China – India – Indonesia – Japan – Republic of Korea – Malaysia – Singapore - Turkey 
 
Europe 
Austria – Belgium – Denmark – Finland – France – Greece – Ireland – Italy – Netherlands – 
Portugal – Spain – Sweden – Switzerland – United Kingdom 
 
North America 
Canada – United States of America. 
 
Middle and South America 
Argentina – Bolivia – Brazil – Chile – Colombia – Costa Rica – Ecuador – El Salvador – 
Guatemala – Mexico – Panama – Peru – Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Oceania 
Australia – New Zealand 
  
 
 
Variables 
GDP Per capita, ppp (1980-2011): from wdi. “GDP  per  capita  based  on  purchasing  power  parity  (PPP)”.  
PPP  GDP  is  gross  domestic  product converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An 
international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as the U.S. dollar has in the United States.” (QoG 
codebook 2013:342). A Growth variable created of GDP per capita to measure per capita growth in Percent. 
 
Total Exports: Agricultural exports (1962-2011), consist of SITC section 2: Agricultural raw materials 
comprise SITC section 2: Hides, skins and furskins, raw, Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed) Cork 
and wood Pulp and waste paper, Textile fibers (other than wool tops and other combed wool) and their wastes 
(not manufactured into yarn or fabric), Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s. excluding divisions 22, 27, 
and 28 (SITC Rev 4)3. 
Ores and metals exports (1962-2011), consist of SITC, divisions 27, 28, 68: Crude fertilizers, other than those of 
Division 56, and crude minerals (excluding coal, petroleum and precious stones), Metalliferous ores and metal 
scrap, Non-ferrous metals (SITC Rev 4). 
Fuel exports (1962-2011), consists of SITC section 3: Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials, Coal, coke 
and briquette, Petroleum, petroleum products and related materials, Gas, natural and manufactured electric 
current (SITC Rev 4). 
 
Constraints on Executive (1946-2012): “The index is composed from the following information: the number of 
independent branches of government with veto power over policy change, counting the executive and the 
                                                             
3  http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=28 
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presence of an effective lower and upper house in the  legislature  (more  branches  leading  to  more  constraint);  
the  extent  of  party  alignment  across branches  of  government,  measured  as  the  extent  to  which  the  same  
party  or  coalition  of  parties control each branch (decreasing the level of constraint); and the extent of 
preference heterogeneity within  each  legislative  branch,  measured  as  legislative  fractionalization  in  the  
relevant  house (increasing constraint for aligned executives, decreasing it for opposed executives). The index 
scores are  derived  from  a  simple  spatial  model  and  theoretically  ranges  from  0  to  1,  with  higher  scores 
indicating  more  political  constraint  and  thus  less  feasibility  of  policy  change.  Note that  the  coding 
reflects information as of January 1 in any given year.” (QoG codebook 2013:223) 
 
Regime type/political system (1975-2012): “Systems  with  unelected  executives  (those  scoring  a  2  or  3  on  
the  Executive  Index  of  Political Competitiveness –  to be defined below) get a 0. Systems with presidents who 
are elected directly or by an electoral college (whose only function is to elect the president), in cases where there 
is no prime minister, also receive a 0.  In systems with both a prime minister and a president,  we consider the 
following  factors  to  categorize  the  system:  a)  Veto  power:  president  can  veto  legislation  and  the 
parliament  needs  a supermajority  to  override  the  veto;  b)  Appoint  prime  minister:  president  can appoint  
and  dismiss  prime  minister  and  /  or  other  ministers;  c)  Dissolve  parliament:  president  can dissolve 
parliament and call for new elections; d) Mentioning in sources: If the sources mention the president  more  often  
than  the  PM  then  this  serves  as  an  additional  indicator  to  call  the  system presidential (Romania, 
Kyrgyzstan, Estonia, Yugoslavia).” (QoG codebook 2013:170). It calculates 0=presidential 1=strong president 
elected by assembly 2=parliamentary. The variable has been computed into a 0 & 1 =0 and 2=1. To clarify, 
Presidential is coded as 0, and parliamentary is coded as 1. 
 
QoG (1984-2012) “The  mean  value  of  the  ICRG  variables  “Corruption”,  “Law  and  Order”  and  
“Bureaucracy  Quality”, scaled 0-1. Higher values indicate higher quality of government (QoG codebook 
2013:103). For full explanation see codebook. 
 
Ethnic Fractionalization (1946-2012): “Restricting attention to groups that had at least 1 percent of country 
population in the 1990s, Fearon identifies 822 ethnic and “ethnoreligious” groups in 160 countries. This variable 
reflects the probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will belong to different such 
groups. The variable thus ranges from 0 (perfectly homogeneous) to 1 (highly fragmented).” (QoG codebook 
2013:199). 
*A variable is not a part of the appendix if it is not described more in detail in the codebook than what is already 
included in the data section. 
 
Appendix B 
Figure 1. 
 
                                                                              
 lambda              -0.2905        0.3857
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
Time trend:   Not included                  Prewhitening: Not performed
Panel means:  Included                                        sequentially
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics:  T,N -> Infinity
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     27
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     43
                                   
Breitung unit-root test for t_exp
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Figure 2. 
SQRT                   R- 
Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared 
---------------------------------------------------- 
dif_exp        12.91    3.59    0.0775      0.9225 
press_parl     2.42    1.56    0.4128      0.5872 
icrg_qog       3.16    1.78    0.3169      0.6831 
h_polcon3    1.51    1.23    0.6631      0.3369 
int1              2.96    1.72    0.3383        0.6617 
int2              14.66   3.83    0.0682      0.9318 
int3               6.52    2.55    0.1535      0.8465 
pwt_openk   1.21    1.10    0.8293      0.1707 
bl_asy25f     2.14    1.46    0.4669      0.5331 
fe_etfra        1.25    1.12    0.8005       0.1995 
pwt_pop      1.19    1.09    0.8377       0.1623 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Mean VIF      4.54 
 
 
Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Mean VIF      6.73
----------------------------------------------------
      int2      9.57    3.09    0.1045      0.8955
  icrg_qog      1.03    1.02    0.9695      0.0305
   dif_exp      9.61    3.10    0.1041      0.8959
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
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